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that many of the decisions cannot withstand such careful scrutiny. Professor
Brest then points us toward other grounds for decision or other possible results
and assists us in moving toward a more logical and humane set of constitutional interpretations.
I would like to note in conclusion that although I have given high praise to
Brest's new casebook (and although I expect to continue using this casebook
for the next several years), I do not mean to imply that the other casebooks
in the field are inadequate. In fact, we are fortunate in having a number
of intelligently assembled casebooks in the constitutional law field and two
of those have beeen improved through new editions that have been published
this fall. I have used the eighth edition of Gunther and Dowling for a number of years, and Gerald Gunther's revision of this casebook is a substantial
improvement of an already fine teaching tool.8 Like Professor 'Brest, he
has placed the procedural material at the end of his volume and has
combined substantive due process with the right to privacy. The fourth
edition of Lockhart, Kamisar, and Choper 9 continues to be the most
comprehensive casebook in the field, and it is always the first book to which
I turn when searching for an answer to any specific question.

THE MORALITY OF CONSENT. By Alexander M. Bickel.' New
Haven and London: Yale University Press. 1975. Pp. vii, 156.
2
Reviewed by Albert Broderick, O.P.

The morning's Washington Post editorial proclaimed do's and don'ts for a
President looking for a Supreme Court nominee, reminding us that for the
first time in half a century no member of academia sits on the Court. It is
easy to -forget that Justice Douglas was appointed as a professor from
Connecticut, not as a lawyer from his beloved Washington state, and that
8.

9.

G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (9th ed. 1975).
W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR, & J. CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, CASES--COM-

MENTS-QUESTIONS (4th ed. 1975).

1. Professor Bickel, now deceased, was a Sterling Professor of Law at Yale Law
School when he prepared this book.

2. Professor of Law, Catholic University of America. A.B., 1937, Princeton University; LL.B., 1941, S.J.D., 1963, Harvard University; D. Phil., 1968, Oxford University.
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four professors sat together on Roosevelt's Court-Stone, Frankfurter, Rutledge and Douglas. If the late distinguished author of The Morality of
Consent had not departed our scene, undoubtedly his name would have been
circulating on many recommended lists-as it was the last time around. This
book, Professor Bickel's last, is evidence of the law profession's great loss at
his death-the loss of a professor from Connecticut, not necessarily of a
prospective member of "The Least Dangerous Branch" (which Bickel called
the Court in an earlier, better study 3).
The great puzzle about this book is whether Bickel designed it as an
analysis of the American constitutional process, or whether he offered it as a
tract in political philosophy and ethics. As the former, it is worth reading.
As political philosophy, or ethics, it is thin fare. The book is worth reading
chiefly because of Bickel's two chapters on the first amendment, a field in
which he proved himself a master-both as a student of the Court and as a
practitioner before it in recent celebrated litigation (e.g., the Pentagon
Papers and DeFunis cases). One may disagree with him here and there as
to how he distinguishes recommending judicial activism to establish reporters'
privilege (Branzberg), and striking down "benign" racial quotas (DeFunis),
and resists it elsewhere. His exposition of the conflict model of our
constitutional system, and of the firm institutional grounding of first amendment decisions, is particularly choice.
A chapter on citizenship is dreary. It extols the undoubted fact that
constitutional development of civil rights since the Civil War has fallen
within the frame of "due process" and "equal protection" of persons, rather
than of "privileges and immunities" of citizens. This is true, and one may
think admirable. It is small wonder that Bickel, a former resident alien,
should feel this keenly. However, the essay goes far afield in arguing why
this should be so, to the extent of identifying the central issue in the Dred
Scott decision as "citizenship" rather than racism (pp. 36-40), and of sniping
at Chief Justice Warren and Justice Black for inappropriate decisional
utterances on citizenship (p. 53).
Other aspects of the book also present difficulty. A major problem arises
from Bickel's division of political man into two groups, "contractarian,"
"majoritarian" liberals, and conservative "Whigs" (with whom he associates
himself). He defines the first as resting on "a vision of individual rights that
have a clearly defined, independent existence predating society and are
derived from nature and from a natural, if imagined, contract" (p. 4),
3. A. BICKEL, THE
op PoLrnics (1962).
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leading one to think of George Bernard Shaw's setting up a straw man so
that he may knock it down. The Whig model, "on the other hand, begins
not with theoretical rights but with a real society"; it assumes that "the values
of such a society evolve, but as of any particular moment

. . .

are taken as

given"; it "is flexible, pragmatic, slow-moving, highly political" and "rests on
a mature skepticism" (id.). This Whig model, according to Professor
Bickel, "places enormous reliance on the political marketplace . ..

a

marketplace of ideas, but one where ideas and the vote are not the only
bargaining units" (pp. 4-5).

By contrast, the "contractarian model . . . is

committed not to law alone but to a parochial faith in a closely calibrated
scale of values. It is moral, principled, legalistic, ultimately authoritarian.
It is weak on pragmatism, strong on theory" (p. 5).
As one reads this high level divisio, one wonders about its import. One
concern, of course, is where one must fit oneself and whether there is no
other place to go. More fundamentally, however, one is left to try to
understand what Bickel was about. At times, he seems to be referring to
law as a process:
Law is more than just another opinion; not because it embodies
all right values, or because the values it does embody tend from
time to time to reflect those of a majority or plurality, but because
it is the value of values. Law is the principal institution through
which a society can assert its values (id.).
If that is all Bickel is about, if his principal concern is merely judicial
methodology, then his classification of political positions can be dealt with in
the context of judicial activism as opposed to inactivism. Such an understanding would explain why Bickel, a former Frankfurter law clerk, would
identify his (and the "Whig") position with judicial flexibility, while making
Justice Black a clear "majoritarian"-the very model of a liberal "contractarian" (pp. 8-9).
However, when Bickel discusses Edmund Burke (citing him through
biographers and commentators rather than from Burke's own writings), he
appears to be writing as a philosopher rather than a jurist. One can only
wish that he had stuck to the latter, for in going beyond law as process to the
content of ideas which are to operate within the legal process, he opts for
Burke's ideas. Such second-hand presentation of philosophy is hardly
satisfactory. One obvious flaw is that in embracing Burke, Bickel never
makes clear which Burke he is taking. It might be the Burke who wrote
that
[t]he lines of morality are not like the ideal lines of mathematics.
They are broad and deep as well as long. They admit of exception,
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they demand no definitions. These exceptions are not made by the
4
process of logic; but by the rules of prudence.
Or it might be the Burke who viewed the mass of men as "a swinish
multitude"' and who confused human society with a particular state,
"equat[ing] the notion of an established form of social life with the notion of
an established set of institutional arrangements."
Writing as a lawyer, Bickel may postulate boundaries in identifying -the
limits of permissible civil disobedience and protest, even in an open-ended
constitutional system like our own, and this may be necessary if only to
insure the continued existence of a particular system. He may also fairly
conclude that "whoever is in power in government is entitled to give effect to
his preferences" (p. 142). But he offers little here as a philosopher, to help
enlighten those preferences. When, finally, we understand this, we can
settle back and enjoy a "process" book of considerable interest.

4. E. BuRKE, AN APPEAL FROM TmE NEW To THE OLD WmIGs 19 (1891).
5. A. MAcINTYRE, A SHORT HISTORY OF ETIcs 228 (1971).

6. id. at 229.

